The primary predictions of strategic-trade theory are not restricted to imperfectly-competitive markets. Indeed, these predictions emerge in a natural three-country extension of the traditional theory of trade policy in competitive m a r k ets, once the theory is augmented to allow for politicallymotivated governments, so that the sign of export policy may b e c o n verted from tax to subsidy. This suggests that the ongoing agricultural trade disputes may be best interpreted from the perspective of strategic-trade theory. In fact, these disputes may o er the most important example yet of strategic-trade theory.
Introduction
As Jackson (1997) emphasizes, the treatment of export subsidies in GATT and now its successor organization, the WTO, is perplexing and controversial. On the one hand, it is sometimes argued that export subsidies expand the volume of trade, enhance consumer welfare and thus warrant encouragement. But others take a less positive view of export subsidies, arguing that such subsidies create unfair advantages, distort market forces and thus should beprohibited. These con icting views are manifested in the ambiguous manner in which subsidies are Bagwell: Columbia University (Department of Economics and Graduate School of Business) and NBER. Staiger: University of Wisconsin (Department of Economics) and NBER. We thank the NSF (SES-9905460) for generous nancial support. treated in GATT and the WTO. For example, GATT Article XVI states conditions under which export subsidies are prohibited for industrial products yet, important exceptions for primary products such as agricultural goods are allowed, provided that the subsidy received does not displace the exports of another member and thereby provide the recipient with more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product.
Given the vague language which accompanies the GATT agricultural exception, it is not surprising that a numberof disputes arose in connection with this exception. For example, as Trebilcock and Howse (1999, p. 249 ) discuss, in a wheat our case from the late 1950's, the GATT panel ruled against a French export subsidy, since the subsidy contributed to an increase in the French export market share and an associated displacement i n t h e export market share of Australia (the complainant). But in a wheat our case of the early 1980's, described in detail by Rhodes (1983, pp. 201-225) , the panel found in favor of an E.C. export subsidy, even though over the time period in question (1959 to 1981 ) the E.C.'s share of the world market appreciated considerably (from 29% to 75%) and the world market share for the U.S. (the complainant) depreciated markedly (from 27% to 9%). The other major wheat our exporters experienced similar losses: the world market shares of Australia and Canada fell from 20% to 2% and 26% to 9%, respectively. In this case, the panel cited the di culty of attributing the market share changes to particular export subsidies. Frustrated with this ruling, the U.S. then initiated a complaint against the E.C.'s policy of subsidizing pasta exports. This dispute centered on the question of whether pasta quali ed as a primary product, and the GATT panel issued a split decision, with the majority in favor of the U.S. position.
The single most important objective of the Uruguay Round, which culminated with the formation of the WTO, was agricultural trade reform (Jackson (1997, p. 314) Rhodes (1993, p. 221) ). Against the backdrop of the wheat-our disputes, membersrecognized that agricultural trade policy must bebrought more clearly and fully under the rules and discipline of GATT. Two speci c goals were to clarify the circumstances under which agricultural export subsidies could be used and to signi cantly reduce the overall extent of export subsidization in agricultural markets. Important strides were made, particularly with regard to the rst objective, but the discussion was highly contentious. The U.S. took the position that agricultural export subsidies should be phased out. This view was endorsed as well by a consortium of countries that are strong exporters in agricultural commodities, know as the Cairns Group.
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On the other side of the debate, the E.C. agreed to a principle of progressive reduction in support, but argued against an outright prohibition of export subsidies for agricultural products. As well, a group of African countries that were net importers of agricultural products were fearful of the consequences of a reduction in agricultural export subsidies. As Croome (1995) explains, the dispute that arose between GATT members concerning the appropriate treatment of agricultural export subsidies was deep, as it delayed considerably the completion of the Uruguay Round -and quite nearly derailed the round altogether.
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In the end, however, an agreement was reached. In the Agreement on Agriculture, the exception granted under GATT Article XVI to primary products is altered, in that member governments from developed countries agree to reduce over a six-year period by 36% the value of agricultural export subsidies and by 21% the volume of agricultural products that receive such subsidies. And many envision that further agricultural trade reform will be achieved in the next WTO round. This remains to beseen, however, and indeed it is often argued that the continuing disputes over agricultural subsidies were the central cause of the failure of the WTO meeting in Seattle. 3 What are the essential features of the ongoing agricultural disputes? No simple list can capture all of the relevant considerations, but the following features seem fundamental. First, the disputants use export subsidies in order to compete for third-country export markets. This stands in contrast to the familiar disputes over import tari s, where the discussion centers on competition for the trading partner's home market. Second, exporting governments sought to cooperate by agreeing upon a reduction in export subsidies of agricultural products, although there were divergent views among GATT members as to the proper extent of the reduction. Third, unlike m a n y other subsidy disputes (e.g., commercial aircraft), the agricultural dispute emerges from a market that has competitive characteristics. Finally, political-economy issues are of particular relevance, as agricultural subsidies are often attributed to powerful farm lobbies, who in turn argue that agriculture warrants special support since this would promote national self-1 The Cairns Group is comprised of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay. It has been estimated that these countries account for around one quarter of the total world exports of agricultural goods. See Croome (1995, p. 31) .
2 For similar interpretations, see, e.g., Low (1993) , Oxley (1990) , Preeg (1995) and Rhodes (1993) .
3 See, for example, Brooke (1999) and Olson (2000) .
su ciency, o set the unusual risks (e.g., weather) that farmers face, and preserve the rural way of life (Trebilcock and Howse, 1999, pp. 252-54) . How are these experiences interpreted by existing theories? Given the signicant role that agricultural disputes have played in world trading relationships, it is perhaps surprising that economists have not developed a theoretical framework that is directed toward an interpretation of the agricultural disputes. On closer examination, however, it is easy to see how this omission came about. Each of the prevailing trade-policy theories is, on its own, immediately inconsistent with one of the fundamental features described above.
Consider rst the traditional economic approach to trade agreements. The traditional model, as formalized originally by Johnson (1953-54) , involves two countries that trade two goods in a competitive-market setting. Governments maximize national income and are attracted to trade-policy instruments as a means to in uence the terms of trade. When this theory is developed in a general equilibrium context, the Lerner symmetry theorem ensures that the trade-policy decisions of governments can besummarized in terms of the export policies that they adopt. A well-known result is then that the optimal unilateral policyfor a government is an export tax. In essence, a government uses the export tax to induce its competitive export sector to restrict output, so that monopoly rents may be created and retained. This theory is problematic as a framework from which to interpret the agricultural disputes, though, since it fails even to o er a potential reason for export subsidization.
When the traditional economic approach is augmented to allow that governments also have political motivations, as for example in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) , this limitation can beovercome. For example, if a government weighs heavily the welfare of its export sector, then the government m a y nd export subsidies desirable. But other incompatibilities remain. Notably, the terms-of-trade implications of trade-policy intervention confront g o vernments with exaggerated costs of stimulating their export sectors. When a government subsidizes its exports, the world price falls, and as a consequence some of the bene t of the export subsidy is received by its trading partner's consumers. When the (politically-augmented) traditional theory is recast in terms of export policies, therefore, the two governments agree that a trade agreement should be designed to encourage export subsidization. This, of course, stands in stark contrast to the desire among the governments of exporting countries to reduce agricultural export subsidies.
Consider next the theory of strategic-trade policy, as pioneered by Brander and Spencer (1985) . Working with a three-country model in which export sectors are imperfectly competitive i n t h e Cournot sense and governments maximize national income, they show that is possible to rationalize both the potential appeal of export subsidies and the desire of exporting countries to limit their use. In their model, each of two exporting countries is tempted to o er an export subsidy, in order to give its exporter a cost advantage and thereby shift pro ts in the ensuing Cournot competition. Since bothexporting governments face this temptation, a Prisoners' Dilemma problem arises between the exporting countries, as they would each do better if export subsidies were prohibited than if they were allowed to compete with subsidies. World welfare, however, rises when exporting countries compete in subsidies, since the gain to consumers in the importing country more than o sets the loss in welfare to the exporting countries. Hence, when governments engage in strategic export subsidization of Cournot industries, exporting nations seek to negotiate limits on export subsidies, and importing governments are opposed to such limits. Strategic-trade theory o ers a promising foundation from which to interpret the agricultural disputes. The theory accounts for export subsidies, explains as well the desire of exporting countries to cooperate and limit the use of such subsidies, and puts at centerstage the competition between exporting governments for third-party export markets. And the theory also could be naturally augmented to include political-economy motivations for governments. The key limitation, however, is that strategic-trade theory is commonly understood to be applicable only for imperfectly-competitive (namely, Cournot) markets. 4 The clear implication is that this theory is more appropriate for the commercial aircraft industry, for example, than for the agricultural market.
In this context, it is important to disentangle the two primary positive contributions of strategic-trade theory.
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The rst contribution concerns the sign (tax or subsidy) of export policy: the theory establishes that a government i n d e e d h a s a p o t e n tial incentive t o i n tervene with an export subsidy. This is the contribution 4 See, for example, Brander (1995) and Helpman and Krugman (1989, p. 88) , who argue that imperfect competition is a de ning characteristic for strategic-trade policy. In their discussion of strategic-trade theory, Krugman and Obstfeld (1997) describe some important case studies that illustrate the possible application of the theory. These cases -the Japanese targeting of steel, the European support of aircraft and the Japanese targeting of semiconductors -all involve highly oligopolistic markets.
5 Strategic-trade theory also carries the normative implication that an export subsidy may be appealing even to a national-income-maximizing government. We emphasize instead the positive predictions of this theory, since we seek to intrepret the agricultural trade disputes.
that has most captured the interest of economists, who have gone on to show that the export-subsidy incentive is sensitive to the form of oligopolistic competition (Eaton and Grossman (1986) , Maggi (1996) ) and the numberof domestic rms (Dixit (1984) ). Second, the theory also o ers predictions concerning the ranking of export policies: exporting governments would prefer to cooperate with lower export subsidies, whereas the world as a whole would bene t from higher export subsidies. The second contribution implies a Prisoners' Dilemma problem between exporting governments, and thereby suggests a framework within which to interpret export-policy disputes.
The theory of export policy that we present may beunderstood as a simple synthesis of the approaches mentioned above. Like the traditional theory, we assume a competitive market, and our governments are well aware of the termsof-trade implications of their trade-policy choices. We also augment the traditional assumptions, by positing that each government h a s as well a political motivation to enhance the welfare of its export sector. Finally, we follow the three-country set-up of the strategic-trade model. Two exporting countries select export policies and all consumption occursin a third importing country.
Under these assumptions, we argue that the two primary contributions of strategic-trade theory are maintained. First, if the political motivations of exporting governments are such that they weigh heavily the pro t (producer surplus) enjoyed by their respective export industries, then the sign of export policy is as in the strategic-trade model: governments intervene with export subsidies (despite the associated terms of trade loss). Second, whatever the political motivations of exporting governments, our competitive model delivers the essential Prisoners' Dilemma structure that arises in the strategic-trade-policy model: exporting governments would gain from an agreement in which they cooperate with less trade-promoting export policies, and importing-government and world welfare are lower when exporting governments cooperate in this way.
The primary predictions of strategic-trade theory are therefore not restricted to imperfectly-competitive markets. Indeed, these predictions emerge in a natural three-country extension of the traditional theory of trade policy in competitive markets, once the theory is augmented to allow for politically-motivated governments, so that the sign of export policymay beconverted from tax to subsidy. This suggests that the ongoing agricultural trade disputes may b e b e s t i n terpreted from the perspective of strategic-trade theory. In fact, these disputes may o er the most important example yet of strategic-trade theory.
The paper is organized as follows. We develop our basic model in Section 2. Next, in Section 3, we present our main ndings. We return to the agricultural disputes in Section 4, and consider these disputes in further detail from the perspective of the model. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We adopt a partial-equilibrium approach and follow Brander and Spencer (1985) in considering two identical countries (A and B) that export a homogeneous good to country C, where all consumers reside. Countries A and B are allowed to each select speci c export subsidies, and for simplicity it is assumed that country C does not intervene in trade. We depart from Brander and Spencer with the assumption that the export industries in countries A and B are perfectly competitive. Formally, the competitive export industry in country A is described by s u p p l y and pro t (producer surplus) functions, Q(P a ) and (P a ), where P a denotes the price of the export in country A and where 0 (P a ) = Q(P a ): The competitive export industry in country B is described symmetrically, w i t h supply Q(P b ) and pro t (P b ), where P b denotes the price of the export in country B:Finally, the demand function in country C is given by D(P c ), where P c is the price of the good in country C. We assume throughout that Q We develop most of our arguments using only the general structure just described. At times, however, it is convenient to have functional forms, so that solutions may be characterized in closed form. We therefore impose the speci c assumptions that Q(P a ) = P a =2, (P a ) = (P a ) 2 =4 and D(P c ) = 1 ; P c . 6 6 Our speci c supply, pro t and demand functions may be derived from underlying production and utility functions, and our partial-equilibrium model may be translated into a general-We emphasize that these restrictions are not necessary for our results. Using the speci c structure of the model, the market-clearing price for P c (s a s b ) is 1=2 ; 1=4(s a + s b ). It can now be veri ed that trade is not prohibited from either exporter if 2 > maxfs b ; 3s a s a ; 3s b g, a condition which holds in the equilibrium derived below.
We assume that exporting governments maximize pro ts less subsidy expenses, where pro ts are scaled by a parameter representing political-economy in uences.
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The importing government welfare is given by consumer surplus. Government welfare functions for the three countries are thus de ned as follows:
where e 1 is a political-economy parameter, with e > 1 when politicaleconomy considerations in uence the government. Observe that the world price (i.e., the terms of trade) in this model is given by P c , and it is direct from (2.1) and (2.2)-(2.4) that a change in P c simply re ects an income transfer, having no e ect on the combined welfare of the three governments.
Subsidies
We now characterize and compare the Nash, cooperative and e cient subsidy levels. We then o er some general observations. equilbrium model. The supply and pro t functions are implied by an underlying production function of the form Q = ( L) 1=2 , where L is labor, under the assumption that labor supply is in nitely elastic at a unitary wage. Likewise, the demand function emerges from a representativeagent utility function of the form U = ( C ;C 2 =2) + N where C and N denote the consumption of the traded good and a numeraire good, respectively. If the numeraire good is su ciently abundant in each c o u n try so that it is always consumed in positive amounts by e a c h a g e n t, the marginal utility of income is xed at one and our partial-equilibrium analysis is appropriate. Trade in the numeraire good is determined by the requirement o f o verall trade balance. 7 This representation of political-economy in uences, which w e borrow from Baldwin (1987) , has been given micro-analytic foundations in the explicit lobbying model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994 
2) As (3.2) reveals, an increase in the export subsidy has three e ects on the welfare of the government of country A.
First, an increase in country A's export subsidy raises the local price in country A, and at a xed volume of production the value to the country-A government of the associated redistribution to its export industry is captured by the term Q( b P a )( e ; 1). When e > 1, this political-economy e ect indicates a bene tto an increase in the export subsidy. Second, the local-price increase in fact raises the level of production, and this distortion increases subsidy expenses, as captured by the term s a Q 0 ( b P a ). This distortion e ect describes a cost to a higher export subsidy. Finally, an increase in the export subsidy lowers the world price and thus diminishes country A's terms of trade. The terms-of-trade e ect is captured by the term Q( b P a ), and this e ect also indicates a cost to a higher export subsidy. Consistent with the traditional model, when the political-economy e ect is absent ( e = 1 ), an export tax is optimal.
A symmetric rst-order condition determines the optimal policy for the government of country B. Let the solution to (3.2) bedenoted s R a = s R a (s b ) , where the R indicates that this is the government of country A's export-subsidy reaction function. Given the symmetry between countries A and B, we may nd the Nash subsidy level, s N , by solving s N = s R a (s N ).
Using the speci c assumptions of our model, we nd that = ;1=3, and we may s o l v e (3.2) to obtain s R a (s b ) = (3 e ;4)(2;s b )]= 3(8 ;3 e )]. To i n terpret this expression, let us assume that s b < 2, indicating that country B's export subsidy is not so large as to drive P c to zero when country A has no subsidy, and that e < 8=3, ensuring that the second-order condition is satis ed. Observe now that an export tax is best for the government o f c o u n try A if political-economy e ects are not large (i.e., e < 4=3). The optimal export policy is an export subsidy, however, if political-economy considerations are important (i.e., e 2 (4=3 8=3)).
Finally, there is a critical intermediate level for the political-economy parameter (i.e., e = 4=3) at which the desire to subsidize for political-economy reasons is just o set by the desire to tax for terms-of-trade reasons, resulting in an optimal policy of laissez faire.
We m a y n o w solve for the Nash subsidy level, nding that it is given by s N = (3 e ;4)=(10;3 e ). Thus, in the Nash equilibrium, the governments of countries A and B select export subsidies (taxes) if the political-economy parameter is su ciently large (small), while a policyof laissez faire is optimal if the politicaleconomy parameter assumes the critical intermediate value.
The Nash equilibrium when political-economy m o t i v es are absent (i.e., e = 1 ) is depicted in the southwest quadrant of the Figure 1 , and the Nash equilibrium when political-economy motivations are important (i.e., e 2 (4=3 8=3)) is represented in the northeast quadrant of this gure. The former equilibrium is labeled N o while the latter equilibrium is denoted as N 1 . In each case, the Nash equilibrium is determined as the point where the iso-welfare contour of the government of country A (country B) i s v ertical (horizontal), so that neither government can increase its welfare with a unilateral policy change.
Cooperative Subsidies
We consider next a di erent thought experiment and allow that the governments of countries A and B cooperate through an agreement under which t h e y c hoose s a and s b so as to maximize their combined welfare. The rst-order condition with respect to s a for this cooperative program is @W a @ b P a
Comparing (3.3) with (3.1), it is apparent that cooperative exporting governments attempt to internalize the e ects of one government's export subsidy on the welfare of the other. In particular, when the government of country A increases its export subsidy, the domestic price in country B drops, reducing pro ts in country B. Cooperative exporters recognize this pro t-shifting externality, whereas noncooperative exporters do not.
Using the particular functional forms speci ed for the model, and exploiting symmetry across countries A and B, w e n d that the optimal cooperative export subsidy, s C , is given by s C = ( e ; 2)=(4 ; e ), so that the optimal cooperative policy may i n volve an export subsidy, but only if the political-economy parameter is quite large (i.e., e 2 (2 8=3)). We m a y n o w compare the Nash and cooperative policies, nding that s N ; s C = 4 (10 ; 3 e )(4 ; e ) > 0 which indicates that exporting governments reduce subsidies when they cooperate. Figure 1 also illustrates the determination of the cooperative export policies, again for the case in which political-economy concerns are absent (labeled C 0 ) a n d for the case in which political-economy concerns are important (labeled C 1 ). In each case, cooperative exporting governments agree to adjust their export policies so as to restrict export volumes from non-cooperative Nash levels. In fact, when the governments cooperate, they agree on a pair of export policies at which their iso-welfare contours are tangent. 
E cient Subsidies
Finally, w e consider the e cient subsidy policy, i n w h i c h s a and s b are selected to maximize the total welfare of the governments of countries A, B and C. Recalling that changes in the world price P c are simply income transfers, it follows that the rst-order condition for s a can bewritten as follows:
It is interesting to compare the condition for e ciency, (3.4), with the noncooperative condition, (3.1). When the government o f c o u n try A sets its policy e ciently, it internalizes the negative externality that its subsidy has on pro ts in country B. It also recognizes the positive externality that its subsidy has for consumers in country C, who experience a terms-of-trade improvement. This terms-of-trade improvement exactly o sets the terms-of-trade loss experienced by countries A and B, and so the government o f c o u n try A ignores the terms of trade altogether when setting its policy in an e cient manner. Similarly, as a comparison of (3.3) and (3.4) reveals, when the government of country A sets its policy in a cooperative fashion, it recognizes the negative externality b e t ween countries A and B, but it doesn't internalize the terms-of-trade improvement experienced by consumers in country C. In fact, the symmetric e cient subsidy solving (3.4) must satisfy @W a =@ b P a = 0 = @W b =@ b P b . Referring to (3.1), we may thus interpret the symmetric e cient subsidy level as being the subsidy level that would be optimal for a government i n a non-cooperative setting if that government w ere not motivated by the implications of its subsidy for the terms of trade. In other words, whether or not politicaleconomy e ects are present, the Nash equilibrium subsidy level is ine cient f r o m the governments' perspective if and only if governments are motivated by the terms-of-trade consequences of their trade policies.
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Using the speci c assumptions of the model, we now calculate the e cient subsidy, s E , nding that it is given as s E = ( e ; 1)=(3 ; e ) 0, so that e ciency calls for an export subsidy if and only if political-economy e ects exist. Direct calculations yield that the e cient subsidy exceeds the Nash subsidy and thus the cooperative subsidy: s E ; s N = 2 ( 3 ; e )(10 ; 3 e ) > 0:
Since the Nash export subsidy exceeds the cooperative subsidy, total welfare of the three governments is higher when exporting countries act noncooperatively than when they cooperate.
Returning to Figure 1 , we complete the graphical representation of the results by depicting the determination of the e cient export policies for the case in which political-economy motivations are absent (labeled E 0 ) and for the case in which these motivations are important (labeled E 1 ). E cient export policies expand export volumes from their Nash levels, and these policies are determined by the point at which the iso-welfare contours of each exporting government are tangent to the iso-world-price locus.
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Since the iso-world-price locus also represents the 10 This point is developed more generally by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) , for a model in which governments set import tari s. In the terminology of that paper, we m a y refer to the (symmetric) subsidy level that satis es @ W a =@ b P a = 0 = @ W b =@ b P b as the politically optimal subsidy. Our analysis con rms (for a three-country export-policy model) that politically-optimal policies are e cient.
11 Recall that the world price, P c (s a s b ), is decreasing in both s a and s b t h us, the iso-world-iso-welfare contour for the importing government, we have that all three isowelfare contours are tangent at the e cient export policies.
Observations
Drawing from this discussion, we summarize now the broader implications of the competitive strategic-export-subsidies model. We consider rst the implications of this model for the sign of export policies. In this regard, we observe that (i). the Nash export subsidy is positive (zero) (negative) if political-economy e ects are large (intermediate) (small) (ii). the cooperative export subsidy can also be positive if political-economy e ects are strong and (iii). the e cient export subsidy is non-negative. The rst observation is perhaps the most interesting, as it con rms that the inclusion of political-economy motivations provides a reason for governments to subsidize the exports of competitive industries. We consider second the implications of the model for the ranking of export policies. We observe that (i). the e cient export subsidy is always higher than the Nash export subsidy, and (ii). the Nash export subsidy is always higher than the cooperative export subsidy. This ranking is independent of the political-economy motivations that governments hold, and indeed the ranking holds in the traditional model in which governments maximize national income. The ranking of export policies is entirely determined by the terms-of-trade externalities that are associated with export policies. The competitive model thus preserves the essential Prisoner's Dilemma structure of the imperfect-competition strategic-trade model: noncooperative exporting-country governments attempt to shift pro ts with export subsidies and would thus gain from an agreement i n w h i c h they cooperate by restraining the use of export subsidies, and importing-country and global government w elfare are higher when exporting-country governments select export subsidies noncooperatively than when they cooperate and reduce subsidies.
In comparing the competitive model developed here with the Brander-Spencer (1985) imperfect-competition model, we note that the ranking of noncooperative, cooperative and e cient export subsidy levels is the same in each model, being completely determined by the terms-of-trade externalities of export subsidies for foreign pro ts and consumer welfare. The models di er only in the mechanism through which the traditional optimal export tari is converted in sign into an export subsidy. Export subsidies arise in the competitive model as a consequence price locus takes a negative slope in Figure 1 . Given our speci c functional forms, this locus is in fact linear, as Figure 1 depicts. of political concerns, whereas the Cournot nature of rm interaction generates an export subsidy in the imperfect-competition model.
Agricultural Trade Disputes: A Prisoners' Dilemma
The discussion in the preceding section establishes that the theoretical scope for strategic-export policy is wider than commonly thought, as it extends beyond oligopolistic markets and into competitive markets. An interesting practical implication is that agricultural export subsidies might b e i n terpreted from a strategic perspective, with exporting countries attempting to use a GATT restriction on export subsidies as a means to escape from a Prisoners' Dilemma problem. The discussion in the Introduction is broadly consistent with this interpretation. In the present section, we describe the agricultural trade disputes in further detail, and o er a more explicit interpretation based on the model presented above.
In the 1970's, the Prisoners' Dilemma avor in the U.S./E.C. interaction was already apparent. As Rhodes (1993, p. 209) notes, the U.S. Millers' National Federation led a Section 301 complaint with the USTR in 1975, charging that E.C. wheat-our export subsidies had been the cause of a reduction of sales of competitive United States wheat our in the markets where the E.E.C. is subsidizing its wheat our. (USTR, 1979) . A similar complaint was led by Great Plains Wheat, and according to Echols (1980-81) this complaint alleged that subsidized Community exports of wheat displaced sales by U.S. exporters in a third country market, Brazil, and depressed world markets. The U.S. delayed action, though, until the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties was completed as part of the Tokyo Round in 1979. This agreement, however, did not greatly clarify the appropriate use of agricultural export subsidies.
In the early 1980's, the disputes intensi ed. As mentioned in the Introduction, the U.S. experienced no real success through GATT when protesting the E.C. wheat-our export-subsidization policy. The U.S. then retaliated with its own wheat-our export-subsidization program in 1983, which targeted the Egyptian market. As Rhodes (1993, p. 215) explains, the prevailing U.S. view was that ...only if the United States matched the European Community subsidy for subsidy, so traditional E.C. markets were lost in favor of U.S. exporters, would the community seriously reconsider agricultural trading methods. As Boger (1984, p. 230 ) details, however, the E.C. instead responded aggressively, choosing to expand its subsidization e orts. A subsidy war was launched.
By the mid 1980's, the costs of the subsidy war were beginning to beunderstood. In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the U.S. and other major exporters that formed the Cairns Group emphasized the costs of a mutually-defeating subsidy war, and they sought to clarify and extend GATT restrictions on agricultural export subsidies as a means to eliminate these costs. As Croome (1995, p. 73) reports:
Almost all governments were increasingly conscious of the burden which subsidies placed on their national budgets and taxpayers, and of the risk that any s u bsidy introduced to give a competitive a d v antage would only be matched by other countries in (as the United States put it)`a self-defeating spiral.' An Uruguay Round agreement that could in e ect provide a mutual disarmament treaty for subsidies would serve the interests of all.
As mentioned in the Introduction, both the U.S. and the E.C. approached the Uruguay Round with a central focus upon the reduction of agricultural export subsidies. They disagreed, though, as to the proper extent of the reduction.
It is interesting to note as well that some GATT members from countries that were net importers of agricultural products feared restrictions on agricultural export subsidies. Croome (1995, p.113) refers to a mostly African group of net food-importing countries that ...relied heavily on imports of grain and other products to feed their populations. They feared that an international agreement to cut export subsidies would result in higher and, for them, una ordable world prices.
Thus the Uruguay negotiations featured a set of countries (the U.S. and the Cairns Group) that sought s e v ere restrictions on agricultural export subsidies, a bloc (the E.C.) that favored moderate reductions, and a group (a set of net food-importing countries) that feared any reductions. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that an agreement did not come quickly.
We may now observe that the preferences attributed to exporting and importing governments as described above parallel those that are predicted by the model. From the perspective of the model, we w ould interpret the E.C. as initially exercising a strategic export policy, with the U. S. and others then retaliating in kind and inducing an outcome analogous to the Nash equilibrium of the model. 12 12 Of course, this is not to say that the E.C. subsidies were pursued only for strategic beggar-Upon learning rst-hand the costs of the resulting subsidy war, the key exporting governments, corresponding to governments A and B in the model, sought to negotiate a reduction in agricultural export subsidies, corresponding to the cooperative solution in the model. Naturally, t h e governments of some net foodimporting countries were concerned, just as would bethe government of country C in the model. And indeed, from a global e ciency point of view, these concerns appear valid: the model predicts that a trade agreement that is e cient from the three governments' perspective w ould call for greater agricultural export subsidies.
It is interesting that exactly the same qualitative conclusions emerge from the imperfect-competition model of strategic trade that Brander and Spencer (1985) rst developed. A nding of the present paper is that the logic of strategic trade applies equally well to competitive markets, once political-economy v ariables are introduced so that export intervention entails a subsidy. Accordingly, the dispute associated with agricultural export subsidies may represent one of the more compelling applications of strategic-trade-policy themes, despite the apparent competitive c haracteristics of the markets for agricultural exports.
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As a nal point, we note that our symmetric model predicts that both the U.S. and the E.C. would agree as to the appropriate extent of the reduction in agricultural export subsidies. This, of course, was decidedly not the case. A natural interpretation is that E.C. representatives (and especially the French) placed a larger weight on the welfare of their agricultural export sectors. The model could be amended to handle this di erence across exporters, if the politicaleconomy weight, e , were allowed to vary across exporters.
Conclusion
We have presented a model of strategic trade that applies for markets with competitive c haracteristics. We h a ve argued as well that the model predicts quite well thy-neighbor reasons. Rather, the argument is that the E.C. subsidies were excessive f r o m t h e perspective of the governments of exporting countries, since some of the cost of the program was borne by competing exporters from non-E.C. countries, who sold at a reduced world price. 13 In applying the theory developed here to the agricultural experience, we m ust mention also two c a veats that warrant further attention. First, to the extent that the supply of a country's agricultural export is determined by a centralized national marketing board, the agricultural market may h a ve some imperfect-competition characteristics. Second, if indeed the agricultural market is well represented as a (short-run) competitive market, one may still question the size of the rents that are available for governments to shift with their export policies. the broad features of the agricultural trade disputes, which are perhaps the most important trade disputes in recent decades.
We conclude with some nal thoughts as regards the treatment of export subsidies in GATT and now the WTO. Our model suggests that exporting countries prefer a limit on export subsidies in order to stem the rivalry in subsidies that otherwise occurs. Importing countries and the world as a whole lose if exporting countries are successful in this endeavor. From this perspective, the perplexing manner in which G A TT and the WTO treat export subsidies may represent conicting consequences that restrictions on export subsidies have for exporting and importing governments. To the extent that the prohibition of export subsidies has beene ective, this policy may correspond to a victory for exporting governments at the expense of importing government -and world -welfare. In future work, we hope to examine the robustness of this conclusion to other modeling frameworks.
14 At a broader level, it is clear that no simple approach toward export subsidization could ever satisfy all goals. Perhaps, as Jackson (1997, pp. 298-99) emphasizes, if the costs and bene ts of a subsidization program are kept within national borders, and thus not shifted onto trading partners, then the program should not bea matter of concern for the WTO. But while this may bea sound principle, cross-border e ects are indeed expected when export subsidies are used. And these e ects are complicated, too, cutting in di erent ways in di erent scenarios: the consumers in importing countries may be inclined to send a note of thanks the import-competing rms in these countries may be harmed and competing exporters from other countries are also likely to be harmed. Our model describes a trading pattern under which o verall government w elfare increases when the subsidization program is enhanced. But other trading patterns could carry di erent conclusions. In this perplexing setting, we believe that theoretical models, motivated in terms of actual export-subsidy disputes, are of particular value. Such models can clarify the key cost-shifting e ects and thereby contribute importantly toward a betterunderstanding of the appropriate manner in which to treat export subsidies within the WTO. This paper is intended as a step in this general direction.
